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A B S T R A C T
The Great Recession has prompted unparalleled economic research on the causes and
handling of crises. It is then important for international investment law to catch up
with the new conceptual developments. This article is an attempt in this direction. Its
first part presents a description of one of the main tools to avoid economic collapses—
early warning models (EWMs)—which have received increasing attention by the
European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Fed. This
part also presents the debate among economists about the meaningfulness of EWMs.
The second part shows how international investment law should respond to this de-
bate and proceed with an assessment of the role that EWMs may have in the interpret-
ation of emergency clauses in BITs and the customary rule of necessity. In particular,
this part deals with the question of what happens in international legal terms when a
State, which relies on EWMs to adopt measures aimed at preventing a crisis, adversely
affects foreign investors. The section also discusses the level of deference that in-
vestor/State tribunals may accord to States relying on EWMs when taking economic
preventive action and illustrates how international arbitration tribunals should deal
with debates on the quality of the given EWMs.
“Everything is fragmented and fluid and unstable and hopeful and dangerous. We
have insights and connections and blank spaces and questions,” said the Egyptian
writer Ahdaf Soueif.1 While she refers to the Arab Spring, her words also apply to its
contemporary opposite: the Western winter—the Great Recession, the current
1 Ahdaf Soueif, ‘Mina’s Banner. Edward Said and the Egyptian Revolution’, London Review of Books, 15 June
2012, available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/2012/06/15/ahdaf-soueif/minas-banner (visited 15 January
2014).
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financial crisis—and describe with accuracy the uncertainties and problems that the
US and European governments have faced over the last six years.
Although economic crises have always existed,2 they were usually in the realm of
emerging or developing economies,3 and the analyses and assessments of these
events were, therefore, important but somehow limited. Not this time around. The
ongoing Great Recession, fuelled by a significant degree of public oversight and de-
liberation, has prompted a breadth of unparalleled political and economic research in
North America and Europe on the causes, consequences, and handling of the crisis.
How will these new realities affect the interpretation of international investment law
in treaties and customary international law (CIL)? Whilst litigation in the aftermath
of Argentina’s 2001 financial crisis triggered the revival and development of the inter-
national law of economic crises, it may not be an exaggeration to expect that, given
its magnitude and the States affected, the Great Recession will take this evolutionary
process much further and into areas unexplored before.
It is, then, important for international investment law to catch up with the con-
ceptual developments in economics that the Great Recession is bringing about. This
article is an attempt in this direction.4 There are, and there will be soon, other devel-
opments, so this piece does not pretend to exhaust the subject-matter. Quite the op-
posite, it seeks to indicate a path for others to continue exploring in the short and
medium term.
This article is divided into three sections. Section I presents the research in
economics on the extraordinary costs of economic crises, and it continues with a de-
scription of one of the main tools to avoid these events—early warning models
(EWMs)—which have received increasing attention in the aftermath of the Great
Recession. This section also presents a comparison between the performance of
EWMs and other tools policy-makers use to anticipate economic crises as well as the
debate among economists about the meaningfulness of EWMs. Section II includes
an analysis of how international investment law should respond to this debate and
proceeds with an assessment of the role that EWMs may have in the interpretation
and application of non-precluded measures clauses in bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) and the customary rule of necessity embodied in Article 25 of the
International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility.5 Sections 3 pre-
sents the conclusions.
2 Vincent Reinhart, ‘A Year of Living Dangerously: The Management of the Financial Crisis in 2008’, 25
Journal of Economic Perspectives 71, 73 (2011).
3 In a more distant past, developed economies also experienced significant economic crises, starting with the
U.S. Great Depression of 1929 and ending with the long Japanese crisis of the 1990s. For an assessment of
common patterns of financial crises, see Carmen M Reinhart and Kenneth S Rogoff, ‘Is the 2007 US Sub-
Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison’, 98 American Economic
Review 339 (2008) [Reinhart and Rogoff, Sub-Prime Crisis].
4 This article can also be seen, to certain extent, as an expression of a recent trend in international law aimed
at a more extended dialogue with other disciplines, such as economics and international relations. See in
this regard, Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship’,
106 American Journal of International Law 1 (2012).
5 By such role, the present author means the possibility of making a causal claim in law based on EWMs. On
the use of econometric models as evidence, see Ioannis Lianos and Christos Genakos, Econometric Evidence
in EU Competition Law: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, Centre for Law, Economics and Society.
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I . D E V E L O P M E N T S I N E C O N O M I C S I N T H E
A F T E R M A T H O F T H E G R E A T R E C E S S I O N
A. The Impacts of Economic Crises
“It was as though the world had awakened in the depths of the ocean.”
—Gabriel Garcı́a Márquez
THE AUTUM OF THE PATRIARCH
Analyses of economic crises from any angle should always be carried out with a solid
foot on the ground: this is to say, with a full awareness of the consequences that
these crises bring about for governments, corporations, and, no less importantly,
human beings, collectively or as individuals. The US Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission did not miss this important focus and pointed out in 2011, already a
while ago and just regarding United States:
As this report goes to print, there are more than 26 million Americans who are
out of work, cannot find full-time work, or have given up looking for work.
About four million families have lost their homes to foreclosure and another
four and a half have slipped into the foreclosure process or are serious behind
on their mortgage payments. Nearly $11 trillion in household wealth has van-
ished, with retirement accounts and life savings swept away. …Many people
who abided by all the rules now find themselves out or work and uncertain
about the future prospects. The collateral damage of this crisis has been real
people and real communities. The impacts of this crisis are likely to be felt for
a generation…6
The raw numbers of past crises portray a tragedy. Unemployment increases during a
period of five years on average, and the unemployment rate goes up about seven per-
centage points.7 Housing prices decline on an average of 35.5% from peak prices and
over six years. Average historical reduction in equity prices is 55.9% and lasts 3.4 years
Faculty of Laws, University College of London, CLES Working Paper Series 6/2012, 84–95, available at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-6-2012 (visited 15 January 2014).
6 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Conclusions, 27 January 2011, xv, xvi, available at http://fcic-static.
law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_conclusions.pdf (visited 14 January 2014).
The full report is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf (visited 5
January 2014). The extent of the impact of the financial crisis can be perceived in the following clip of a
popular American TV show, Dr. Oz, ‘The New Face of Hunger in America’, available at http://www.doc-
toroz.com/episode/new-face-hunger-america. There, it is shown that poverty is no longer concentrated in
traditional minorities, but that the majority also significantly suffers the impact of the crisis, something cor-
roborated by IMF research. See Abdul Abiad, Ravi Balakrishnan, Petya Koeva Brooks, Daniel Leigh, and
Irina Tytell, ‘What’s the Damage: Medium-term Output Dynamics after Financial Crises’, Working Paper
09/245, at 19, International Monetary Fund, 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/
2009/wp09245.pdf (visited 14 January 2014).
7 See Carmen M Reinhart and Kenneth S Rogoff, ‘The Aftermath of Financial Crises’, NBER Working Paper
No. 14656, January 2009, 6, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14656.pdf?new_window¼1
(visited 16 January 2014) [Reinhart and Rogoff, Aftermath]. This article contains evaluations of eighteen fi-
nancial crises in developed economies.
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on average. Gross domestic product falls 9.3%, and the decline lasts two years on
average.8 Government debt rises 86% over the three years after a banking crisis takes
place. The explanation for such significant impact is a sharp reduction in tax revenue
and significant increases in public spending to fight crises.9
This time the output losses of the Great Recession have already significantly ex-
ceeded those of recent crises. Output is, on average, 17% below the pre-crisis pattern
after five years: the average of prior crises was 9%,10 and there is evidence that the
losses are more lasting. In the past, output returned to its pre-crisis level within five
years. This time around, none of the countries that have experienced a banking crisis
have returned to the pre-crisis output level.11
But there are other costs no less important and unaccounted for in economics:
the political costs. Contrary to wars against external enemies, which rally societies
around a common goal, economic crises fragment them and bring about severe polit-
ical instability and civil unrest.12
It is then understandable to find that governments and markets seek to avoid
all these costs. With the significant stakes at hand, the prediction of economic crises
has always been a matter of discussion and analysis. Although, as Krugman states,
‘Economies are complicated, ever-changing entities’,13 there is a body of economic
research aimed at identifying indicators of the emergence of economic crises—
banking, debt or currency crises—called ‘early warning’ literature. The need for early
warning models (EWMs) appeared after the 1994 Mexican crisis and gained momen-
tum after the 1997 Asian crisis.14 Given the amount of resources to be devoted to
this area of research in the years to come, it is expected that important developments
will take place and that EWMs will increasingly be used as a policy instrument by
States.
B. Economic Crises and the Progressive Development of EWMs
Seules les choses non dénombrées, non enregistrées et aux caractéristiques
non déterminables provoquaient des catastrophes redoutables.
Orhan Pamuk
ISTANBUL, SOUVENIRS D’UNE VILLE
8 See ibid, at 8.
9 See ibid, at 10. Bailouts do not seem to constitute a significant element of post-crisis debt burdens. See
ibid, at 10.
10 See Abiad et al., supra note 6, 24.
11 See ibid.
12 The current Great Recession has not been the exception, the Occupy Wall Street movement in USA and
the Indignados in Spain being just two examples. On the former movement, see David Graeber, The
Democracy Project: a History, a Crisis, a Movement (2013).
13 Paul Krugman, ‘How the Case for Austerity Has Crumbled’, New York Review of Books, 6 June 2013, 3,
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/jun/06/how-case-austerity-has-crumbled/
(visited 15 January 2014) [Krugman, How the Case for Austerity Has Crumbled].
14 See Andrew Berg, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Pattillo, ‘Assessing Early Warning Systems: How
Have They Worked in Practice?’, IMF Staff Papers 52(3), 462, 463 (2005), available at http://www.imf.
org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2005/04/pdf/berg.pdf (visited 15 January 2014).
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It is, then, not surprising that economists have been trying to develop models that
identify early signals of emerging crises and prevent their catastrophic losses. The
Great Recession has brought attention back to economic research of this character.
Telling proof of this new reality is the words of the then IMF Managing Director in
the aftermath of the global financial crisis: ‘We at the Fund have already begun inten-
sifying our early warning capabilities and will be strengthening our collaboration with
others involved in this area.’15
The early warning literature includes models focussed on developed economies,16
on developing and emerging economies,17 and also on all kinds of economies com-
bined.18 In addition, and most recently, EWMs have been designed for single econo-
mies.19 The models are not designed to attempt to anticipate economic crises of all
sorts.20 In effect, there are EWMs specifically developed for currency crises, debt and
banking crises,21 private sector debt crises, or equity market crises. Further, it is im-
portant to keep in mind that even EWMs designed to anticipate the same types of
crises may differ on the definition of when such a crisis is emerging,22 the variables
selected, and the countries whose data are included, to mention but a few
differences.
There are two main models: the discrete and continuous representation of crises.
The discrete representation model is able to send clear signals to policy-makers re-
garding warning indicators when they have reached a certain threshold.23 It is for the
modeller to determine such threshold, and he or she must try to balance the risk of
making two different kinds of mistakes. A low threshold increases the risk of false
alarms, the risk being that of sending a warning for situations in which no serious
risk of a crisis exists. The modeller of EWMs must also avoid a high threshold, which
15 Dominique Strauss-Kahn, ‘Letter from IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn to the G20
Heads of Governments and Institutions’, 9 November 2008, as quoted by Andrew K Rose, Mark M
Spiegel, ‘Could an early warning system have predicted the crisis?’, 3 August 2009, Blog: Vox Research-
based Policy Analysis and Commentary from Leading Economists, available at http://www.voxeu.org/art
icle/could-early-warning-system-have-predicted-crisis (visited 12 January 2014).
For a general description of the early warning literature and of its different methodologies, models, and
indexes, see Jan Babecký, Tomáš Havránek, Jakub Matějů, Marek Rusnák, Kateřina Smı́dková and Bořek
Vašı́ček, Leading Indicators of Crisis Incidence, Evidence from Developed Countries, European Central
Bank, Working Paper Series, No. 1486. October 2012, 5–6, available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/
scpwps/ecbwp1486.pdf (visited 13 January 2014) [Babecký et al.].
16 See ibid, at 8.
17 See Berg et al., supra note 14, 462–502; M Bussière, ‘Balance of Payment Crises in Emerging Markets:
How Early Were the ‘Early’ Warning Signals?’, 45(12) Applied Economics 1601 (2013) [Bussière, How
Early Were the Warning Signals].
18 See Babecký et al., supra note 15, 7.
19 See Ian Christensen and Fuchun Li, A Semiparametric Early Warning Model of Financial Stress Events,
Bank of Canada, Working Paper 2013–13, at 1, available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/up
loads/2013/05/wp2013-13.pdf (visited 7 January 2014). Models designed for single countries face a chal-
lenge: how to rely only on domestic information if the given State’s financial system is highly integrated
within international markets. See ibid, at 6.
20 The mathematics of the models is not included here. It can be consulted in the secondary sources cited
in this article.
21 See Berg et al., supra note 14, 467.
22 For instance, policy-makers and private actors, such as private financial institutions, may differ and have
differed in their EWMs regarding the definition of when there is a currency crisis. See ibid.
23 See Babecký et al., supra note 15, 6–7.
Early Warning Models and Int’l Investment Law  5







increases the risk of missing crises, those the EWM is not able to identify.24,25 EWM
design may well incorporate an inclination to avoid one mistake more than the other,
or to give to the model equal weight.26
As to the continuous EWMs, Babecký et al. state:
continuous indicators of crisis have been proposed…that allow the EWM to
explain the actual scale of real costs or nominal movements without the need
to decide whether the scale is sufficiently high to produce a ‘yes’ value.
Another advantage is that continuous indicators do not suffer from a lack of
variation of the dependent variable when too few crisis events are observed in
the data sample.…The disadvantage of this approach lies in its limited capacity
to send straightforward (‘yes/no’) signals to policy makers regarding the prob-
ability of crises.27
Regardless of the type of EWM, it is important to determine what the appropriate in-
dicators are for a model to truly render warnings of a potential crisis meaningful, a
topic that will be addressed below.28 These indicators are not fixed, but evolve and
have been increased,29 as a result of past unpredicted crises with new dimensions
and causes.
24 See Matthieu Bussiere and Marcel Frarzcher, ‘Towards a New Early Warning System of Financial Crisis,
25 Journal of International Money and Finance 953, 957 (2006).
The risk of failing to take into consideration certain information that later turns out to be important is
by no means limited to EWM literature. Any econometric exercise faces a similar risk. Carmen M
Reinhart and Kenneth S Rogoff, two very influential American scholars, have just recently experienced it.
By not taking into account certain variables, an important conclusion they arrive at—according to which
economic growth was to stagnate in an economy once its government debt-to-GDP ratio was higher than
90%, which had a significant influence on and justified US and European austerity policies—proved not
to be accurate, as the authors themselves acknowledged. See Carmen M Reinhart and Kenneth S Rogoff,
‘Growth in a Time of Debt’, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 15639, January 2010,
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15639.pdf (visited 7 January 2014). The challenging paper
was Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin, ‘Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle
Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff’, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Working
Papers Series. No 322, 15 April 2013, available at http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/working_
papers/working_papers_301-350/WP322.pdf (visited 6 January 2014). According to Krugman,
‘Reinhart-Rogoff may have had more immediate influence on public debate than any previous paper in
the history of economics’. Krugman, How the Case for Austerity Has Crumbled, supra note 13, 1, available
at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/jun/06/how-case-austerity-has-crumbled/. See also
Lawrence Summers, ‘Lessons can be learned from Reinhart-Rogoff error’, Washington Post, 5 May 2013,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/lessons-can-be-learned-from-reinhart-rogoff-
error/2013/05/05/6ea6aa72-b43f-11e2-bbf2-a6f9e9d79e19_story.html (visited 6 January 2014).
25 The notion of false alarms must be qualified. It should not include events in which policy measures are
taken in response to the warning and no crisis ensues. See Berg et al., supra note 14, 489.
26 See ibid, at 475–76.
27 Babecký et al., supra note 15, 7.
28 See ibid, at 17. The variables may well vary depending on the type of crises that the given EWM deals
with.
29 For instance, the expansion of international financial markets is a new element with EWMs. See Andrew
Berg and Catherine Pattillo, ‘The Challenges of Predicting Economic Crises’, IMF Economic Issues No 22
(2000), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues22/index.htm#3 (visited 10
January 2014).
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Babecký et al. identified, on the basis of 30 potential early indicators in the
European Union and OECD over the last 40 years, some key warning factors. They
were, first, excessively rapid growth in domestic credit to the private sector with a
four-year lag30; and second, a high ratio of debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP),
which may be associated with a significant reduction in international trade, exclusion
from international financial markets, and higher borrowing costs.31 Other, although
late, early warning indicators are government debt, current account deficits, foreign
direct investment, and fall in house prices and share prices. These are risk factors
that deserve to be monitored.32
Bussière has also recently further developed his previous EWM on the basis of a
prediction of vulnerability of emerging countries to currency crises within a time win-
dow of twelve months.33 He has found that the following variables predict currency
crises: the ratio of short term debt/international reserves, the over-appreciation of
the nominal effective exchange rate vis-à-vis its trend, and contagion from other
economies.34
A very important point is the inclusion of political variables within EWMs, as a
necessary complement to improve their performance. Bussière and Mulder have
done so.35 They have incorporated variables such as the occurrence of elections and
the stability of governments in one of their models.36
Although EWMs cannot anticipate the exact date on which a crisis will hit a coun-
try or a set of countries, they can offer a time window.37 In effect, recent economic
research within the EWM literature has developed models aimed at identifying the
time lag between a warning of a potential crisis and the potential timing of its occur-
rence.38 Babecký et al. regard that the lag of the early warnings must be a minimum
of one year so that policy-makers can still be able to take preventive measures.39
Further, to be useful for policy-makers, the models must rely on data related to
the relevant indicators from various economies for long periods of time, which may
30 See Babecký et al., supra note 15, 21.
31 See ibid.
32 See ibid, at 22.
33 The time window is determined through expert judgment, and most EWMs have a one- to two-year win-
dow. See ibid, at 10.
34 See Bussière, How Early Were the Warning Signals, supra note 17, 1618.
35 See Mattieu Bussière and Christian Mulder, ‘Political Instability and Economic Vulnerability’, 5
International Journal of Finance and Economics 309 (2000).
36 See Matthieu Bussière and Christian Mulder, ‘In Defense of Early Warning Signals’, December 2010, at 7
(unpublished paper), available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228532957_In_Defense_of_
Early_Warning_Signals (visited 8 January 2014) [Bussière and Mulder, Early Warning Signals]. Bussière
also mentions in a more recent article that some institutional features that may have a bearing on crises
may nonetheless be difficult to incorporate within EWMs, such as the operation of the judicial system,
contract enforcement and the rule of law. See Bussière, How Early Were the Warning Signals, supra note
17, 1606.
It is worth mentioning that country risk scores include political economy variables. See in this regard,
Andrew K Rose and Mark M Spiegel, ‘Cross-Country Causes and Consequences of the Crisis: An
Update’, 55 European Economic Review 309 311.n.5. (2011) [Rose and Spiegel, Causes and Consequences
of the Crisis: An Update].
37 See Bussière, How Early Were the Warning Signals, supra note 17, 1603.
38 See Babecký et al., supra note 15, 13.
39 See ibid.
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sometimes be a challenge.40 For instance, indicators that may be identified after a cri-
sis as being useful to predict others in the future—such as liquidity and leverage
ratios—may be difficult to incorporate within new models, because there are no data
on them for some countries,41 the data are available but for a limited period of
time,42 or the data are available but are not reliable.43 In any case, no EWM can in-
corporate all variables for each country.44
Also, the set of countries included within the data should share some features for
the given model to identify common causes of crises.45 It has also been suggested
that EWMs include two types of variables, fundamentals46 and vulnerabilities,47 for
they complement each other.48
The models are tested in two ways, say Berg and Cantillo:
on the data and time period for which they were designed (called in-sample
performance), and on data or a time period for which they were not specific-
ally designed (called out-of-sample performance). Clearly for a model to be
useful it would have to provide informative signals out-of-sample, that is, be-
yond the time period for which the model itself was estimated.49
In addition, in-sample models performed better than out-of-sample ones, since the
latter may not have included variables that later turn out to be relevant to the emer-
gence of a crisis, or they did not receive sufficient weight within the model.50 Such
was the case with the models prior to the Asian crisis. However, it is the out-of-
sample tests of EWMs that are useful to policy-makers, since it is their result that
may trigger preventive actions or measures.51
40 See ibid, at 8.
41 For instance, Berg and Pattillo point out that the short-term foreign debt of the private sector is not avail-
able for many countries. See Berg and Pattillo, supra note 29.
42 See Babecký et al., supra note 15, 8.
43 This is the case regarding information on lending booms, in which data on the level of bad loans may not
be reliable for under-reporting reasons. See Bussière, How Early Were the Warning Signals, supra note 17,
1604.
44 See ibid, at 1602.
45 See ibid, at 1604. Care must be taken also regarding the comparability of risks in multi-country models.
As the Asian crisis revealed, a currency crisis may occur in many countries at the same time but for differ-
ent reasons. The said crisis affected some Asian countries due to risks associated with the banking sector,
while the crisis spread to Latin American countries owing to their large fiscal deficits. How to capture
these differences in models that identify trends is a challenge.
46 For instance, the current account balance, level of exchange rate, credit growth, and fiscal balance. See
Berg and Pattillo, supra note 29.
47 For instance, EWMs for currency crises include vulnerability variables aimed at determining the likeli-
hood of successful defence of a currency in the event of an attack. To this end, the model may include a
variable that determines a ratio between the level of international reserves and foreign and domestic
short-term liabilities. The lower the first and the higher the second, the higher the vulnerability of a do-




51 An EWM developed by Bussière applied out-of-sample to the 2007 crisis was able to predict a currency
crisis for eight countries, and other eight countries would not suffer a crisis. However, the EWM gave five
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Finally, it is important to keep in mind that EWMs cannot be confounded with
absolute future prediction. As Babecký pointed out to the present author:
predicting the exact timing of the crises is a very challenging issue. The
concept of the early warning models should be rather perceived from a bit
different viewpoint: the fact that model issues a warning signal does not auto-
matically mean that there is a crisis coming. It is just a ’blinking indicator’, a
call for attention.52
Since antiquity, and as the ancient Arab poet once said centuries ago, ‘I know what is
happening today and what happened yesterday, but I cannot tell what tomorrow will
bring.’53 Although prospective analyses are part of today’s world, they have con-
straints that must always be kept in mind.54
1. Early warning models vis-à-vis other instruments
developed to anticipate economic crises
An analysis of EWMs is not complete without looking at the performance of other
tools that governments, international financial institutions, and markets use to
attempt to anticipate economic crises of any sort, such as pure guess research and
non-model-based forecasts such as agency ratings and private analysts rating cur-
rency risks.55
EWMs have been compared to non-model methods. Berg, Borensztein, and
Pattillo of the IMF did so in 2005 after the Asian currency crisis. According to these
authors, the EWMs designed prior to this event, although not excessively accurate,
did identify the vulnerability of some countries that were hit by the crisis,56 although
not all of them ended up being affected by it.57
By contrast, sovereign spreads, a non-model-based indicator of currency risk, did
a poor job as predictor of the countries affected by the Asian crisis.58 The same can
be said of sovereign ratings by agencies such as Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s. The
ranking of the 10 most affected countries was much better than that of the 10 least-
affected countries,59 precisely the opposite from what could be expected of a tool
false alarms and missed crises in four countries. See Bussière, How Early Were the Warning Signals, supra
note 17, 1618.
52 E-mail communication. On file with author.
53 FA al-Bustani et al., al-Majani al-haditha, Vol. I, 1946, at 103.
54 Prospective analysis is a challenge not only for EWMs but for any econometric analysis. As Lawrence
argues, ‘The extrapolation from past experience to future outlook is always deeply problematic and needs
to be done with great care’. See Summers, supra note 24.
55 Public and private models to anticipate economic crises differ in their design. The former are more long-
term oriented in order for policy-makers to adopt measures to prevent the calamity, whereas the latter
have a more short-term orientation. However, private sector models are important, given that they are
widely circulated among investors, and they rely on them for their decisions. See Berg et al., supra note
14, 463–46.
56 See ibid, at 469.
57 The applied EWM identified Brazil and the Philippines as vulnerable countries, although they were not
hit hard by the Asian crisis, according to Berg et al. See Berg et al., supra note 14, 469.
58 See ibid.
59 See ibid, at 471.
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aimed at anticipating costly economic events. A third non-model-based predictor,
surveys of currency market analysis, includes quantitative and qualitative variables—
from macroeconomic factors to others referring to the quality of economic and polit-
ical decision-making—for several countries. The surveys rendered similar disappoint-
ing results. They gave favourable assessments to the countries more hit by the crisis
before it took place. And in contrast, countries with higher risk evaluations in the
surveys ended up being less likely to have a crisis during the years 1997–98.60
In concluding, Berg, Borensztein, and Pattillo state:
[T]here is little evidence that “market views,” or analysts’ views, as expressed
in spreads, ratings, and surveys, are reliable crisis predictors, important as they
may be in determining market access….
The results of this round of EWS testing were sufficiently promising to suggest
the continued implementation of these models on an ongoing basis, along
with further research and development.61
2. Criticism of early warning models
Not everybody agrees on the effectiveness of EWMs,62 in part because crises are
hard to anticipate, due to the complex mix of economic, political, and psychological
factors that trigger them.63 Some scholars think, like Jorge Luis Borges in FICTIONS,
that ‘reality does not usually coincide with predictions’.
EWMs have been questioned on a set of grounds. The first is what is called the
impossibility theorem. According to the theorem, crises cannot be predicted. If they
were, policy-makers would take actions and prevent them, which would mean that
the model could no longer be accurate.64
The second criticism aimed at EWMs lies on the other side of the spectrum. The
criticism is called the self-fulfilling prophecy. EWMs are dangerous. That is, in the
aftermath of a warning of a crisis, market participants or policy-makers may react in a
way that triggers the very crisis anticipated. For instance, in the face of a currency cri-
sis, market participants will sell the given currency and bring about the crisis.65
The European Systemic Risk Board has recognized the existence of this worri-
some dimension of EWMs and suggested caution in the handling of the conclusions
that these models may yield:
The issues potentially addressed in the warnings and recommendations will be
extremely sensitive and we must be careful about adverse effects, such as the
warnings turning into self-fulfilling prophecies by frightening financial markets.
60 See ibid.
61 See ibid.
62 See Rose and Spiegel, Causes and Consequences of the Crisis: An Update, supra note 36.
63 See Berg and Pattillo, supra note 29.
64 See Bussière and Mulder, Early Warning Signals, supra note 36, 6.
65 See ibid, at 3. It is argued that the Mexican crisis was partly the cause of such self-fulfilling prophecies.
Certainly, other factors contributed to this particular crisis, such as a large current account deficit
prompted by an over-valuated Mexican peso. See Berg and Pattillo, supra note 29.
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The decision whether or not to publish will, therefore, require a case-by-case
decision after a careful assessment of the potential consequence.66
However, among the main critics of EWMs are Rose and Spiegel, according to
whom:
Despite the fact that we use a wide number of possible causes in a flexible stat-
istical framework, we are unable to link most of the commonly-cited causes of
the crisis to its incidence across countries. This negative finding in the cross-
section makes us sceptical of the accuracy of “early warning” systems of poten-
tial crises, which must also predict their timing.67
This was a statement made in 2009, when the Great Recession was just unfolding.
However, Rose and Spiegel updated this research in 2012, incorporating not only
data generated during the crisis—up to 2010—but also the new literature on
EWMs.68 These authors used a non-structural Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause
(MIMIC) model of crises and examined seven variables of crises for 107 countries:
GDP growth, underlying growth trend, output gap, consumption growth, and a com-
bination of four variables: multilateral exchange rate, real GDP, national stock mar-
ket, and country risk ratings.69 Rose and Spiegel then individually assessed each of
the causes of the Great Recession that had been identified by the literature.70 They
confirmed some causes of crises across countries, such as pre-crisis current account
deficits, more liberal market regulation, run-up in real housing prices, and short-term
external debt.71 However, the authors did not find such strong results when all of the
causes were considered simultaneously.
The above-mentioned authors found that current account deficits and credit mar-
ket regulations strongly explained the 2008–09 crises in several countries, but both
66 See on-line discussion, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference¼MEMO/
09/405&format¼HTML&aged¼0&language¼EN&guiLanguage¼fr. As quoted by Bussière and Mulder,
Early Warning Signals, supra note 36, 3.
67 Andrew K Rose and Mark Spiegel, Cross-Country Causes and Consequences of the 2008 Crisis: Early




68 See Rose and Spiegel, Causes and Consequences of the Crisis: An Update, supra note 36, 310. As to new de-
velopments, these authors highlight the following:
literature has since sprung up which diverges from our methodology in four respects: (a)
the measure of crisis intensity (the dependent variable); (b) the potential causes of the
crisis (the covariates); (c) the estimation procedure used to link potential causes and
consequences of the crisis; and (d) the sample of countries under consideration. In order
to see whether our results are incompatible with those of others, we now follow more
closely the steps in the literature.
See Rose and Spiegel, Causes and Consequences of the Crisis: An Update, supra note 36, 312.
69 See ibid, at 313.
70 See ibid, at 315.
71 See ibid, at 318.
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variables were not relevant for previous crises, such as that of 2001–02.72 On this
basis, Rose and Spiegel concluded again:
[T]he results…are sobering for those who believe in the viability of such
cross-country early warning systems.
It is natural for economists to generalize from experiences of a few particularly
salient countries to make generalizations, though it is often inappropriate. Our
poor regression results are simply telling us that the pre-conditions for the cri-
sis in the United States (or Iceland, or Latvia, etc.) often do not describe other
countries particularly well. Credit growth was high before 2007 in Australia,
Canada, and South Africa, yet these countries seemed to have weathered the
crisis well. Real housing prices actually fell well before the crisis in Japan,
Germany and Portugal, yet these countries were hard hit. Since it is difficult to
understand the cross-country incidence of the Great Recession even in retro-
spect, we are dubious about the potential for comparable ‘‘early warning’’ fore-
casting model going forward.73
3. Responses to criticisms of early warning models
However, EWM scholars have responded to some of these criticisms. Bussière and
Mulder posit that to ensure the relevance of EWMs and avoid self-fulfilling prophe-
cies, it is necessary to prevent early warnings from being made public.74
These authors make a relevant point regarding the importance of EWMs. Even
with their limitations, they are a good substitute for judgment-based assessments, be-
cause the former offers indications of economic vulnerabilities.75 On the other hand,
while these authors recognize that the assessment of potential crises needs also to in-
corporate other criteria, such as information from market participants or market sen-
timent,76 EWMs may serve to narrow the possibility of crisis denial in order to avoid
political costs.77
In addition, EWMs may render results that are not biased by recent and not-so-re-
cent events or prior successful realities, which may cloud more contemporary judg-
ments urging for preventive action. This was the case with the operation of EWMs
in Korea before the Asian crisis. The models rendered vulnerability warnings, but the
warnings were not heard because of the overall perception of the Korean success
story and the market trust in it.78
72 See ibid, at 324.
73 Ibid, at 318, 324.
74 See Bussière and Mulder, Early Warning Signals, supra note 36, 7.
75 See ibid. This has been the case with the first generations of EWMs. They are useful to identify what
countries are more vulnerable at times of international financial turmoil. See Berg and Pattillo, supra
note 29.
76 The inclusion of this information within EWMs is challenging, because it is not easy to measure, on one
hand, and on the other, it can provide policy-makers with a warning only once the crisis is on the verge
of erupting. See ibid.
77 See Bussière and Mulder, Early Warning Signals, supra note 36, 8.
78 See Berg et al., supra note 14, 491.
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EWMs are in the process of evolution, and all past crises have led to improve-
ments and to identification of new variables not included before.79 The fact that they
may sometimes miss crises or send false alarms should not lead us to discard
EWMs.80 Bussière and Mulder suggest that these events may lead to improvements
to EWMs in the future. Missed crises give policy-makers and researchers the oppor-
tunity to take into account new variables that were not considered by prior models
and to improve them.81 For instance, risk contagion was not a variable in many
EWMs82 and was at the root of the failure of some models to properly anticipate the
Great Recession in some countries.83 In addition, the existence of false alarms means
that there are positive variables, not included within the EWMs, that may help to
avoid a given crisis, which, if taken into consideration within EWMs in the future,
might lead to their refinement.84
In the end, it seems that the right approach to decision-making is to combine
EWMs with non-model-based predictors in order to make decisions regarding crisis
prevention. The solution may not be as easy as it looks, since the latter have proved
to not be reliable as crisis predictors in the not-so-distant past, according to
79 To mention but an example, the first generation of EWMs developed during the 1970s, among others, by
Paul Krugman did not anticipate the 1990s crises. After them, it was clear that government budget bal-
ance and, in particular, a higher surplus increased the risk of a crisis, even if this looked paradoxical, and
had to be incorporated within the next generation of EWMs. As to the first generation of EWMs, see
Paul Krugman, ‘A Model of Balance-of Payments Crises’, 11 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 311
(1979). As to the evolution of EWMs regarding the particular topic highlighted in this footnote, see
Bussière, How Early Were the Warning Signals, supra note 17, 1608.
80 It is important to highlight that, given that EWMs collect data from different countries, their ex post gen-
eral application to a set of countries may lead one to conclude that they accurately predicted a crisis in re-
lation to some countries, missed others, and also produced false alarms regarding other countries. For
instance, the ex post application of the Bussière and Mulder’s model designed in the 1990s to the 2008
crisis indicated significant vulnerabilities for some countries, failed to predict vulnerabilities for Malaysia,
and led to a wrong warning for Hungary. See Bussière and Mulder, Early Warning Signals, supra
note 36, 12.
81 See ibid, at 8.
82 However, this is not to say that contagion was never regarded as a risk, since prior to the Great
Recession, currency crises usually spread across countries. See Bussière, How Early Were the Warning
Signals, supra note 17, 1601. However, Bussière has also shown that contagion can also create positive
outcomes, since a currency crisis in one country may bring about a flow of investment to other emerging
economies, as was the case after the 1994 Mexican crisis, when investors moved to the emerging econo-
mies in Asia. See ibid, at 1608.
83 See Bussière and Mulder, Early Warning Signals, supra note 36, 13. The contagion took place, first, re-
garding the sub-prime crisis from USA to Europe, and, second, the expansion of the sovereign crisis
within European Union economies. As to the former, see Giovanni Lombardo and Luca Dedola,
Financial Frictions, Financial Integration and the International Propagation of Schocks, European Central
Bank, ECB Research Bulletin. No 14, Autumn 2011, 5, and as to the latter, see Giovanni Amisano and
Oreste Tristani, The Euro Area Sovereign Crisis: Monitoring Spillovers and Contagion. European Central
Bank, ECB Research Bulletin. No 14, Autumn 2011, at 2, available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/
researchbulletin14en.pdf (visited 8 January 2014). It may be worth noting that definitions of the term
‘contagion’ can vary. See Amisano and Tristani, supra note 83, 1, and Steven B Kamin and Laurie
Pounder De Marco, How Did a Domestic Housing Slump Turn into a Global Financial Crisis?, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers. Number 994, January
2010, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2010/994/default.htm (visited 15 January
2014).
84 See Bussière and Mulder, Early Warning Signals, supra note 36, 8.
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the IMF.85 But on the other hand, the current Great Recession is rooted in an exces-
sive reliance on mathematical models, with little judgment, by financial institutions,86
so the combination of economics and judgment seems to be the best one to be car-
ried out by governments regarding the assessment of crisis imminence. Bussière and
Fratzscher synthesize well the role EWMs should play in policy-making:
It should be stressed that [Early Warning System] models cannot replace
the sound judgment of the policy maker to guide policy, but they can play an
important complementary role as a neutral and objective measure of
vulnerability.87
With the amount of additional information brought about by the current financial
crisis and with the substantial research that is focussing on EWMs in recent years, it
may be safe to say that important improvements to the theoretical models can be ex-
pected. EWMs are here to stay.
This article, however, does not claim that EWMs will always be used as a policy-
making tool. Even in the face of clear warnings, governments have strong incentives
to avoid the political and economic costs of recognizing the existence of an upcom-
ing economic crisis. Crisis denial is not an uncommon reality; on the contrary, it is
regarded as an initial stage in the development of economic calamities.88 Instead, this
article deals mainly with the issue of crises that are sought to be prevented on the
basis of the use of EWMs.89
I I . E A R L Y W A R N I N G M O D E L S A N D N E C E S S I T Y
I N I N T E R N A T I O N A L L A W
As EWMs develop further as a response to the Great Recession, it would not be sur-
prising to see that their use as a policy-making tool by governments increases. How
do EWMs interact with international investment law?
The first, and surely most important, interaction is when a State, relying on sig-
nals from EWMs, adopts measures that, while violating an international obligation
owed to an investor, successfully prevent a crisis that is likely to unfold. As a result,
85 See Berg et al., supra note 14, 491.
86 See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, supra note 6, xix.
87 Bussière and Fratzscher, supra note 24, 970.
88 See Edwin M Truman, Policy Responses to the Global Financial Crisis, Peterson Institute for International
Economics, Remarks presented at the Ninth Annual International Seminar on ‘Policy Challenges for the
Financial Sector Emerging from the Crisis: Building a Stronger International Financial System’, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund, 3 June 2009,
available at http://piie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID¼1225 (visited 12 January 2014).
See also Anna Gelpern, ‘Financial Crisis Containment’, 42 Connecticut Law Review 493, 506–13 (2009).
89 It can also be claimed that the use of EWMs may not occur with ease, since policy-makers may lack the
economic expertise to act upon these models. This claim should be viewed with care. Although it is un-
deniable that economic policy-making is embedded within domestic and even international politics and
also driven by political concerns, large bureaucracies, not uncommon in countries of all sorts and sizes,
are familiar with economic analyses, even if those presiding over them lack a strong background in eco-
nomics. It is hardly the case in modern government that the scope of public action is set by the intellec-
tual acumen of the officials vested with the power to enact regulations or make decisions in the economic
realm.
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the host State avoids the losses associated with the averted crisis, but it faces the in-
vestor’s claim of violation.
The host State may seek to justify its measure on the basis of non-precluded
measures clause provided for in a bilateral investment treaty or to excuse it on the
basis of the customary rule of necessity embodied in Article 25 of the International
Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility, if the given BIT does not provide
for such a clause.90 According to this provision:
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the
wrongfulness of an act not in conformity with an international obligation of
that State unless the act:
a. is the only means for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a
grave and imminent peril; and
b. does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or State towards
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding wrongfulness if:
a. the international obligation in question precludes the possibility of
invoking necessity; or
b. the State has contributed to the situation of necessity.91
Before the 2001 Argentine crisis, the international law of necessity was very thin,
although the 1990s had seen a groundbreaking judgment by the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) in the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/
Slovakia).92 Today, the international law of necessity is a very dynamic area of public
90 See Award, In the Matter of an UNCITRAL Arbitration, National Grid P.L.C. v Argentine Republic, ¶ 180,
3 November 2008. ¶ 256 [National Grid Award], available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
NGvArgentina.pdf (visited 10 January 2014).
91 James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction,
Text and Commentaries 178 (2002) [hereinafter ILC’s Commentaries].
92 See International Court of Justice, Case Concerning The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/
Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, I.C.J. Reports 1997, 7 [Gabcikovo-Nagymaros], available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1¼3&p2¼3&k¼8d&case¼92&code¼hs&p3¼4 (visited 10
January 2014).
There, the Court held that the above-mentioned provision had the status of customary international
law; that the concept had to be interpreted very narrowly, since it served to excuse wrongful acts under
international law; and that the requirements must be satisfied cumulatively by the State invoking neces-
sity. See ibid, ¶ 51. International arbitration tribunals have supported this conclusion, see, for instance,
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Impregilo S.p.A v. Argentine Republic, Award,
21 June 2011. ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17. ¶¶ 344, available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType¼CasesRH&actionVal¼showDoc&docId¼DC2171_En&caseId¼C109
(visited 8 January 2014). See Total S.A v Argentine Republic, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No ARB/
04/1, 27 December 2010, ¶ 221 [Total Decision on Liability], available at http://italaw.com/documents/
TotalvArgentina_DecisionOnLiabilty.pdf (visited 4 January 2014).
For a complete assessment of the requirements in light of recent case law, see Andrea K Bjorklund,
‘Emergency Exceptions: State of Necessity and Force Majeure’, in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and
Christoph Schreuer (eds), Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008) 459, 474–88 [Bjorklund, Emergency Exceptions].
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international law and international investment law due to the significant number of
international decisions and to the booming scholarship they have engendered.93
Although BIT non-precluded measures clauses and Article 25 are separate provi-
sions and the former cannot be interpreted in light of the latter,94 there are common
elements. An important one for the purpose of this article is the kind of crises that
may fall under them. The case law is consistent in including economic crises as the
93 See, among many, Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez, ‘New Approaches to the State of Necessity in Customary
International Law: Insights from WTO Law and Foreign Investment Law’, 19 American Review of
International Arbitration 463 (2008); Alberto Alvarez-Jiménez, ‘Foreign Investment Protection and
Regulatory Failures as States’ Contribution to the State of Necessity under Customary International Law:
A New Approach Based on the Complexity of Argentina’s 2001 Crisis’, 27 Journal of International
Arbitration 141 (2010); Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez, ‘The Interpretation of Necessity Clauses in Bilateral
Investment Treaties After The Recent ICSID Annulment Decisions’, 3 Yearbook on International
Investment Law and Policy 411 (2011) [Alvarez-Jimenez, The Interpretation of Necessity Clauses in BITs];
William W Burke-White and Andreas von Staden, ‘Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The
Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Treaties’, 48 Virginia
Journal of International Law 307 (2007–2008); Jacques Werner, ‘Revisiting the Necessity Concept’,
10 Journal of World Investment and Trade 549 (2009); José Manuel Cortés Martı́n, ‘El Estado de
Necesidad en Materia Económica y Financiera’, XXV Anuario Espanol de Derecho Internacional 119
(2009); Jurgen Kurtz, ‘Adjudging the Exceptional at International Investment Law: Security, Public
Order and Financial Crisis’, 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 325 (2010); Bjorklund,
Emergency Exceptions, supra note 92; Andrea K Bjorklund, ‘Economic Security Defenses in International
Investment Law’, 1 Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 479 (2009); Michael Waibel,
‘Two Worlds of Necessity in ICSID Arbitration: CMS and LG&E’, 20 Leiden Journal of International
Law 637 (2007); José E Alvarez and Kathryn Khamsi, ‘The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors. A
Glimpse into the Heart of the Investment Regime’, 1 Yearbook on International Investment Law and
Policy 379 (2008/2009); José E Alvarez and Tegan Brink, ‘Revisiting the Necessity Defense:
Continental Casualty v. Argentina’, 3 Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 319 (2010/
2011); Tarcisio Gazzini, ‘Necessity in International Investment Law: Some Critical Remarks on CMS v
Argentina’, 26 Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 450 (2008); Théodore Christakis, ‘Quel
Remede A L’Eclatement de la Jurisprudence CIRDI sur les Investissements en Argentine? La Decision du
Committe Ad Hoc Dans L’Affaire CMC c. Argentina’, CXI Revue General du Droit International Public
879 (2007); Campbell McLachlan, ‘Investment Treaties and General International Law’, 57 International
and Comparative Law Quarterly 361 (2008); Stephan W Schill, ‘International Investment Law and the
Host State’s Power to Handle Economic Crises. Comment on the ICSID Decision in LG&E v. Argentina’,
24 Journal of International Arbitration 265 (2007); August Reinisch, ‘Necessity in International
Investment Arbitration—An Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases? Comments on CMS
v. Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina’, 8 Journal of World Investment & Trade 191 (2007); Emmanuel
Gaillard, ‘Chronique des Sentences Arbitrales. Centre International pour le Règlement des Différends
Relatifs aux Investissements’, 134 Journal du Droit International 335 (2007); Antoine Martin,
‘Investment Disputes after Argentina’s Economic Crisis: Interpreting BIT Non-precluded Measures and
the Doctrine of Necessity under Customary International Law’, 29 Journal of International Arbitration 49
(2012).
94 See Ad Hoc Committee, CMS Gas Transmission Company v Argentine Republic, Decision of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/01/8 (25
September 2007), ¶ 131 [CMS Decision on Annulment], available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType¼CasesRH&actionVal¼showDoc&docId¼DC505_En&caseId¼C4 (visited
13 January 2014); Ad Hoc Committee, Sempra Energy International v Argentine Republic, Decision on the
Argentine Republic’s Application for Annulment of the Award, ICSID Case No ARB/02/16 (29 June 2010)
[hereinafter Sempra Decision on Annulment], available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType¼SearchRH&actionVal¼SearchSite&SearchItem¼sempra (visited 10 January
2014); Award, In the Proceedings between Continental Casualty Company v. The Argentine Republic, 27
August 2008, ¶ 167 [Continental Award], available at http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/documents/
p/24.aspx (visited 12 January 2014).
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type of event that may justify or excuse a violation of a treaty provision.95 In CIL, ne-
cessity can be invoked regarding the protection of a broad set of interests that may
qualify as being essential. Relying on the work of the International Law Commission
(ILC), the ICJ held in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros that essential interests were not only just
those associated with the existence of States.96 Second, the nature of the peril that may
justify the use of this rule of customary international law is strictly defined. Article 25
speaks of ‘grave and imminent peril’, and the ICJ declared in the foregoing judgment
that this kind of peril denoted a sense of immediacy and proximity.97 This is not to
say, though, that grave risks that are certain and will inevitably take place in the long
run do not qualify as a peril that may trigger the declaration of the state of necessity.
The ICJ explicitly expressed that perils of this character could also be regarded as im-
minent.98 The threshold is quite high, since the ICJ has stated that grave risks that are
only probable cannot serve as a basis for the declaration of the state of necessity.99
As will be seen in more detail below, States can use EWMs to justify the adoption of
measures aimed at preventing the occurrence of a severe crisis that EWMs have detected.
Or in other words, the question is whether States can rely on EWMs to demonstrate the
existence of the requirement of a severe risk over an essential security interest under BIT
non-precluded measures clauses, or the imminence of a grave peril over an essential
interest under the customary rule of Article 25 of the ILC’s Articles. Before delving into
this topic, this article will address whether the existence of a lack of consensus or a ma-
jority view on the usefulness of EWMs would prevent their use in the interpretation and
application of BIT non-precluded measures clauses and the customary rule.
A. Majoritarian acceptance of or consensus on the usefulness of
EWMs: not a sine qua non requirement for their use in the
interpretation of international law
Quite important regarding the use of EWMs is whether the existence of a majority
on their usefulness is necessary for the models to be relevant in the interpretation of
95 See Decision on Liability, In the Proceedings Between LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E
International Inc. and Argentine Republic, ¶ 238. ICSID Case No ARB/92/1 (3 October 2006) [LG&E
Decision on Liability], available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType¼Cases
RH&actionVal¼showDoc&docId¼DC627_En&caseId¼C208 (visited 13 January 2014); Continental
Award, supra note 94, ¶¶ 175, 178.
96 See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note 92, ¶ 53. For the origin of necessity, see Roman Boed, ‘State of
Necessity as a Justification for International Wrongful Conduct’, 3 Yale Human Rights and Development
Law Journal 1, 4 (2000).
97 See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note 92, ¶ 54.
98 See ibid.
99 See ibid. Imminent risks and the possibility of adopting a sort of exceptional measure are not the exclusive
domain of public international law or of foreign investment law. The law of the World Trade
Organization has specific provisions to address threats of material injury to domestic industries, such as
Article 3.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement (ADA), Article 15.7 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (ASCM), and Article 4 of the Agreement on Safeguards (AS). There are some
parallels worth highlighting. The threat of injury to the domestic industry of like products by the dumped
or subsidized product must be foreseen and imminent. Thus, the mere possibility of injury is not suffi-
cient for the imposition of anti-dumping duties or countervailing duties (Article 3.7 ADA and Article 15.7
(ASCM)). Evidence supporting the existence of the threat of injury and the causal link with the increase
in imports for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures must be objective (Article 4 AS).
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or application of international law, be it non-precluded measures clauses or the cus-
tomary rule of necessity. Apparently, the answer would be yes. Only once the major-
ity or a consensus of economists and policy-makers have agreed on the merits of
EWMs should their usefulness to the interpretation or application of international
law be recognized. However, in this regard, it is worth recalling the words of Amos
Oz, the Israeli writer, in A TALE OF LOVE AND DARKNESS:
Life is made up of different avenues. Everything can happen in one of several
ways, according to different musical scores and parallel logics. Each of these
parallel logics is consistent and coherent in its own terms in itself, indifferent
to all the others.
The current world is one of parallel logics, as Amos Oz rightly and beautifully points
out; thus, undisputed majorities and consensus are sometimes elusive. EWMs are
not the exception, as has been illustrated. This being so, care has to be taken when
requiring consensus or majoritarian views as a precondition for the use of the models
in the interpretation of foreign investment law. In fact, such requirement should not
exist.
Indeed, it is important to look at the law of the World Trade Organization to find
inspiration to guide us on how EWMs could be used in the interpretation of interna-
tional investment treaties or customary provisions. There, there is a familiarity with
the use of science as a basis for the imposition of trade restrictions by Members.
This is mainly the case with the Agreement on the Application of sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures and its Articles 5.1 and 5.2, according to which:
1. Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures
are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the
risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account risk
assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations.
2. In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available scien-
tific evidence….
The WTO Appellate Body has made it clear that a majoritarian view among scien-
tists is not a requirement for the lawfulness of the scientific bases of the sanitary or
phytosanitary measures. When interpreting, specifically, Article 5.2, the WTO
Appellate Body stated in European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products (Hormones):
[T]he risk assessment could set out both the prevailing view representing the
‘mainstream’ of scientific opinion, as well as the opinions of scientists taking a
diverging view. Article 5.1 does not require that the risk assessment must ne-
cessarily embody only the view of the majority of the relevant scientific
community…In most cases, responsible and representative governments tend
to base their legislative and administrative measures on ‘mainstream’ scientific
opinion. In other cases, equally responsible and representative governments
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may act in good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be a divergent
opinion coming from qualified and respected sources.…100
Underlying this Appellate Body’s finding is the recognition of the parallel logics that
Oz talks about. A similar approach should be taken by investor/State arbitration tri-
bunals regarding the use of EWMs in the interpretation and application of interna-
tional investment law despite the debate among economists on their value as a crisis
prevention tool.101
The relevance of EWMs in the interpretation of international law should be
linked to the principle of good faith. State policy-makers may choose to rely on
EWMs and adopt measures aimed at preventing a crisis. If the given crisis is pre-
vented but the measures adopted constitute violations of an international law obliga-
tion, the requirement of a serious threat would be met.
Finally, it is important to highlight that the use of econometric analysis is not a re-
quirement under BIT non-precluded measures clauses or the customary rule of ne-
cessity, as is the use of science in the WTO SPS Agreement. This is an important
difference. So, if under a stricter regime, as in WTO law, scientific majority is not
required, there is no reason to request such majority regarding EWMs in interna-
tional investment law, since this field of law affords States wider latitude regarding
what kind of tools they can use to anticipate grave economic risks.
B. Type of BIT violations that can be justified by non-precluded
measures clauses based on EWMs
An analysis of the effect of the successful invocation of BIT non-precluded measures
clauses in light of the type of investors’ rights adversely affected by the actions or
regulations adopted by the host State reveals that the successful invocation of a BIT
100 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998, ¶ 194, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/hormab.pdf (visited 10 January 2014). As a result of
this approach, WTO panels have accepted sanitary and phytosanitary measures supported by risk assess-
ments based on divergent scientific opinions rendered by qualified and respected sources. In effect, the
panel in European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products
stated:
Where a given risk assessment sets out a divergent opinion and this opinion comes from
qualified and respected sources, it can be reasonably said that an SPS measure which re-
flects the divergent opinion is ‘based on’ the risk assessment in question inasmuch as the
divergent opinion is expressed in that risk assessment.
WTO Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS291/R, 29 September 2006, ¶ 7.3060, available at http://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds291_e.htm (visited 8 January 2014).
101 The parallels between WTO law and public international law and foreign investment law cannot go fur-
ther to cover, for instance, methodological approaches. In effect, the use of methodologies to determine
threat of injury to domestic industries of like or directly competitive products under WTO law cannot
be of much use to determine the existence of a threat to an economy. The methods used in the applica-
tion of WTO law rely on microeconomic analysis for a single product within a single country, whereas
methodologies, such as EWMs, to determine threats to national economies rely on macroeconomic
models involving multiple variables, usually related to several countries.
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non-precluded measures clause may exclude the unlawfulness of the majority of vio-
lations of the given BIT, as the CMS annulment committee pointed out,102 but
not of all of them. This is also true regarding the successful invocation of BIT non-
precluded measures clauses based on EWMs for actions aimed at preventing unfold-
ing economic crises.
The US–Argentina BIT may well serve to prove this particular point. Its Article
IV(3) provides:
Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments suffer losses in the
territory of the other Party owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution,
state of national emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar
events shall be accorded treatment by such other Party no less favorable that
that accorded to its own nationals or companies or to nationals or companies
of any other third country, whichever is the more favorable treatment, as
regards any measures it adopts in relation to such losses.103
Article IV(3) is a provision that, without precluding or mandating compensation,
deals with it under certain circumstances. It becomes applicable whenever any of
such circumstances also serve as grounds for the successful invocation of Article XI,
the non-precluded measure clause of this treaty.104
This is not to say that Article IV(3) only becomes relevant when there is a crisis
covered by Article XI. Indeed, it is perfectly possible that an event of social disturb-
ance, for instance, may not trigger Article XI but nonetheless prompt the application
of Article IV(3). However, the opposite may be true in most cases: whenever a situ-
ation is covered by Article XI by involving issues of maintenance of public order, res-
toration of international peace, or protection of an essential security interest, the
situation would trigger Article IV(3), since it may well be intimately related to any of
the circumstances provided for in this provision.
Can it then be said that if, under a situation of emergency, Argentina or USA
compensated domestic investors and not foreign investors, in clear violation of
Article IV(3), such violation could be justified by Article XI of the BIT? Apparently,
it could, since according to the test for the application of Article XI, a court and tri-
bunal must first find a violation of the BIT and then proceed to determine whether
the violation is justified under Article XI, and if so, the violation is excluded.
However, a more detailed analysis of the effect of primary rules in the context of
BITs shows that, although BIT non-precluded measures clauses have a broad scope
to justify violations of a treaty, they cannot cover all, particularly violations of a
102 See CMS Decision on Annulment, supra note 94, ¶ 129.
103 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, USA–Argentina, 14 November 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124.
104 Article X provides for:
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for
the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection of its
own essential security interests.
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provision like Article IV(3).105 Two kinds of rights underlie this situation: pre-crisis
rights and crisis rights, defined as those acquired by foreign investors by virtue of the
existence of the given emergency or disaster.
To begin with, the most common situation is one where foreign investors hold
rights protected by the BIT prior to any circumstance covered by a BIT non-
precluded measures clause, which could be labelled pre-crisis rights. If the circum-
stance occurs and prompts the adoption of acts or regulations that adversely affect
such rights, the clause can justify their violation. No compensation is then due by the
host State for the amount of damage that investors bear as a result of measures
adopted to face the given crisis.
But it is also possible for foreign investors to acquire new rights as a result of the
crisis that impelled the invocation of the BIT non-precluded measures clause, if such
a situation also falls under a provision similar to Article IV(3). For instance, if during
the crisis, the host State compensated national investors to a certain extent and did
not do the same for investors of a party to a BIT that included an analogous provi-
sion, these investors would acquire, by virtue of the crisis, a national treatment right
regarding any compensation received by domestic investors. To be sure, this right
may not be the same as the full compensation right that would exist if the violation
had not been justified by the BIT non-precluded measures clause, and the right is re-
stricted only to the compensation that national investors in similar circumstances
received.106 In other words, it is a different kind of compensation based on a differ-
ent legal ground.
The violation of this crisis right cannot be justified by the successful invocation of
the BIT non-precluded measures clause, because it is the application of the clause it-
self that is one of the conditions for the existence of the right under Article IV(3),107
and it is not possible for the act that contributes to creating a right for the investor
to also be the one that extinguishes it.
In the end, provisions like Article IV(3) constitute limitations on host States’
actions under the specific factual situations provided therein, which also operate
when any of these situations prompt the invocation of BIT non-precluded measures
clauses.
Can it be said that precepts akin to Article IV(3) apply only when one of the fac-
tual situations provided therein takes place but not when any of them are prevented,
as in the case of the prevention of economic crises? Such a narrow scope should be
based on a complete interpretation of the given precept according to Articles 31–33
of the Vienna Convention. Although a detailed analysis of this topic is beyond the
scope of this article, the author is inclined to suggest that, despite the fact that the
text of Article IV(3), seen in isolation, appears to indicate that it does not cover
losses associated with crisis prevention, an interpretation of this provision and others
of similar content in light of context and the supplementary means of interpretation
of a treaty seeking to protect foreign investment may end up offering enough bases
105 See Alvarez and Khamsi, supra note 93, 434.
106 For a similar argument, although grounded on a different basis, see Schill, supra note 93, 284. To be
sure, the right is not that of obtaining exactly the same amount of money that domestic investors
received, but of obtaining a sum that implies a treatment similar to that accorded to them.
107 The second source of the specific right is the differential treatment itself.
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to conclude that the precept also covers events of losses resulting from measures
aimed at preventing any of the above-mentioned events. Consequently, the violation
of this kind of precept as a result of measures taken to prevent an economic crisis
should not be justified by the successful invocation of a non-precluded measures
clause based on EWMs.
C. The use of early warning models in the interpretation of non-precluded
measures clauses or the customary rule of necessity
1. The use of early warning models to detect grave and imminent economic perils
In a very important statement, the Continental Tribunal suggested that measures ad-
versely affecting foreign investors that are part of a policy aimed at preventing a crisis
could be easily challenged. This would be so since it would be difficult to demon-
strate the necessity of the given measure or action.108 But on the other hand, if no
action is taken and the crisis unfolds, then tribunals would regard the omission as
part of the contribution of the given State to the situation of necessity or to the crisis,
again denying it the benefit of the excuse under customary international law or of
the clause under international investment law, as the tribunal in Suez, Sociedad
General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAgua Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v
the Argentine Republic did. The tribunal stated: ‘Among Argentina’s contributing fac-
tors to the crisis were…delays in responding to the early signs of the crisis…’109 In
other words, prevention would not meet the necessity test, and lack of prevention
would be later interpreted as a contribution to the situation of necessity.
The early warning literature should be used as the tool to avoid this trap.
International tribunals should allow States to rely on EWMs to determine when
there was a grave and imminent risk to their economies.110
108 When discussing certain measures that, according to the claimant, could have been adopted by
Argentina to prevent its 2001 crisis, the Continental tribunal commented:
Such a pre-emptive or anticipatory default could have been more easily challengeable as
to the absence of any “necessity” under the BIT.
Continental Award, supra note 94, ¶ 229.
109 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona S.A., and InterAgua Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. the Argentine Republic, Decision on
Liability, ¶ 242. ICSID Case No ARB/03/17, 30 July 2010 [Suez Aguas de Barcelona Decision on
Liability], available at http://italaw.com/documents/SuezInterAguaDecisiononLiability.pdf (visited 16
January 2014).
110 This situation would not take place regarding some BIT self-judging clauses, which constitute jurisdic-
tional bars. However, not all BIT clauses may achieve this goal. It all depends on how their texts are in-
terpreted in light of the principles of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In addition, it is
also important to take into account that it is up for international courts and tribunals to assess the scope
of these clauses by virtue of their power to assess their own jurisdiction, so strict and flexible interpret-
ations of these jurisdictional bars may well be expected. See Michael D Nolan and Frédéric G Sourgens,
‘The Limits of Discretion? Self-Judging Emergency Clauses in International Investment Agreements’,
3 Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy 363, 364 (2010/2011) and Laurence Boisson
de Chazournes, ‘The Principle of Compétence de la Compétence in International Adjudication and its
Role in an Era of Multiplication of Courts and Tribunals’, in M Arsanjani, J Cogan and S Weissner
(eds), Looking to the Future: Essays in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2011) 1027.
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It is, though, important to qualify how EWMs work in practice. One has to take
into account that economic policy should not be formulated on the basis of the
use of a single EWM. Certainly, such situation is unlikely to take in place in
reality. One might expect governments to make decisions on the basis of broader
information, not a single EMW but several with different methodological
approaches and indexes,111 in addition to any information that may come up from
other sources, such as credit agencies’ ratings and market participants.112 However,
what one can expect is that States may sometimes rely mainly on the warnings pro-
vided for by EWMs mainly to adopt measures aimed at preventing severe economic
crises.
In addition, it should not be required by tribunals that all the information point
exactly in the same direction, in the sense that all crisis prevention instruments,
EWMs, and non-model instruments, should converge on indicating the imminence
of a crisis. This would be so because not all sources, such as credit-rating agencies’ re-
ports, are aimed at anticipating crises and not all market participants may be right
regarding their information.
When the evidence is conflicting, it is up to international tribunals to determine
whether they find the gravity and imminence of the given crisis proved or whether
the crisis was not imminent but just probable, and therefore, the necessity justifica-
tion or excuse must fail.
This conclusion raises a different but related issue: debates about faulty EWMs.
The Reinhart/Rogoff error clearly illustrates that econometric models may have de-
sign faults, in terms of the chosen variables, their weighing, the countries included,
the availability or reliability of the data used, among many others. A debate in litiga-
tion may exist regarding errors in the design or data of the EWMs on which a host
State relied, whose purpose is to demonstrate that, owing to errors of these kinds,
there was no such risk or the risk was neither grave nor imminent.113
This debate can certainly exist in investor/State arbitration, and decisions based
on good faith errors in EWMs should be upheld by international tribunals. Crisis
prevention is an important component of any kind of policy-making and is in itself
costly, as will be seen below.114 Thus, requiring of States perfection as the standard
111 See Babecký et al., supra note 15, 9.
112 Speaking about economic decision-making in general, Lawrence Summers states:
[N]o important policy conclusion should ever be based on a single statistical result.
Policy judgements should be based on evidence accumulated from multiple studies done
with different methodological approaches. Even then, there should be a reluctance to ac-
cept conclusions from ‘models’ without an intuitive understanding of what drives them.
Summers, supra note 24.
113 The situation is factually intensive, and its importance may depend on the specific circumstances of the
case. It might not be that relevant when the host State relied on many EWMs, and errors are identified
in one of them. In effect, the other EWMs and other sources may still provide a conclusion on the grav-
ity and imminence of a crisis that is objective, coherent, and based on the data.
However, even if a host State relied on several EWMs, the debate may turn out to be relevant if the
host State relied to a significant extent on the EWMs claimed by the investor to have errors.
114 See infra text accompanying note 134.
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of EWMs would certainly ignore the complexity of the operation of the State
apparatus.115
However, arbitration tribunals should set a limit: manifest errors in EWMs should
not be permitted, in principle. However, even in such a case, sometimes caution is
advised, and tribunals should not rush to conclude that a severe crisis was not immi-
nent once they have found important errors in the given EWMs. Take the example
of a State that decided to rely on a specific EWM that sent signals of an upcoming
economic calamity when other EWMs and tools were not anticipating any. In this
case, it cannot be easily said that all the host State had to do was to review the model
that was sending warnings in order to detect any faulty features it might have. The
fact is that the State facing this situation of conflicting warnings also knows that
EWMs may also miss crises, so the State does not know which is the faulty EWM,
and to clearly identify it, it has to review all of them. A tribunal should take into ac-
count the feasibility of such a review when determining whether the error contained
in the EWM on which a State relied was so manifest as to conclude that the grave
and imminent risk of a crisis did not exist.116
Generally, debates about the design of EWMs, either due to errors or to different
economic views, should be handled by investment tribunals with a certain degree of
deference to host States’ economic bases for their conclusion that an economic crisis
is imminent. Deference to the technical bases of States’ decisions is not strange to in-
vestment arbitration.117 For instance, the NAFTA tribunal in Methanex v U.S. dealt
with the issue of whether a technical report detailing the risks of a chemical offered
enough support for its ban on the sale and use. The tribunal pointed out that ‘whilst
115 Although they referred to a standard of protection for investors, the words of the tribunal in Gami
Investment Inc v the Government of the United Mexican States are worth recalling, since these words are
fully applicable to the situation discussed here. In effect, quoting the NAFTA award in S.D.Myers, the
former tribunal stated:
When interpreting the ‘minimum standard’ a [NAFTA] Chapter 11 tribunal does not
have an open-ended mandate to second-guess government decision making.
Governments have to make many potentially controversial choices. In doing so, they
may appear to have made mistakes, to have misjudges the facts, proceeded on the basis
of a misguided economic or sociological theory, placed too much emphasis on some so-
cial values over others and adopted solutions that are ultimately ineffective or counter-
productive. The ordinary remedy, if there were one, for errors in modern government is
through internal political and legal process….
Original footnote: First Partial Award, op cit., note 8, para 261 (Note 8 states: ‘First Partial Award of 13
November 2000, 8 ICSID Reports (forthcoming), at para 260 (2000).’
116 As has been seen, EWMs require massive amounts of data regarding different variables in many coun-
tries, which means that they are costly to maintain and, therefore, to review. As to the high maintenance
costs of EWMs, see Bussière and Mulder, Early Warning Signals, supra note 36, 6.
117 See Yuka Fukunaga, ‘Standard of Review and ‘Scientific Truths’ in the WTO Dispute Settlement System
and Investment Arbitration’, 3 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 559 (2012). Sometimes, and
on the basis of domestic regulation, the standard of review of technical and economic matters by domes-
tic courts may differ. In the European Union, the standard of review of the former is narrower than that
of the latter. The Court of First Instance’s ruling in Microsoft v Commission [Case T-201/04, 2007.
E.C.R. II-3601] is claimed to have made this distinction. See Lianos and Genakos, supra note 5, 56–57.
No such distinction is made in BITs or in CIL, so the standard of review of technical issues, as defined
by international investment arbitration, can equally be applied to economic matters.
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it is possible for other scientists and researchers to disagree in good faith with certain
of its methodologies, analyses and conclusions, the fact of such disagreement, even if
correct, does not warrant this Tribunal in treating [the report] as part of a political
sham’.118 Equally, the tribunal in Chemtura v Canada coped with Canada’s adoption
of a regulation on canola seeds treated with a particular pesticide. The tribunal
stated that its task was not ‘to second-guess the correctness of the science-based deci-
sion-making of highly specialized regulatory agencies’.119 The tribunal limited
its evaluation to whether Canada had acted in bad faith when carrying out the risk
assessment on which it has based its regulation.120
Deference to the economic bases of the conclusion on the risk of a grave and im-
minent crisis does not mean deference to the conclusion itself, in the sense that in-
vestor/State tribunals should be deferential to the host State’s perception of an
upcoming crisis and its decision to prevent it. As in American administrative law, a
deferential standard regarding technical bases does not preclude in-depth assessment
of the government’s decision by courts.121 Thus, arbitral tribunals should evaluate
with rigour whether the conclusion as to the gravity and imminence of the given eco-
nomic calamity is objective and coherent and has a sufficient basis in the available
data of the EWMs.122
The use of EWMs also raises the question of the risk of their abuse to ground the
prevention of economic crises and the adoption of measures adversely affecting for-
eign investors to this end. The approach suggested here would prevent such abuse.
Mere reliance on EWMs should never be enough to demonstrate the existence of an
upcoming economic crisis. The conclusion must strongly emerge from the models
118 Methanex Corporation v United States, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits (3 August 2005), pt III, ch
A, ¶ 101, available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf (visited 8
January 2014).
119 Chemtura Corporation v Canada, Award, 2 August 2010, ¶ 134, available at http://italaw.com/docu
ments/ChemturaAward_000.pdf (visited 8 January 2014).
120 See ibid, paras 146–63.
121 See Rahim Moloo and Justin M Jacinto, ‘Standards of Review and Reviewing Standards: Public Interest
Regulation in International Investment Law’, 4 Yearbook on International Investment Law and Policy
539, 546 (2011–2012).
122 The WTO Appellate Body established these requirements of the scientific evidence to support an SPS
measure, and the same logic should be used by international tribunals regarding the connection between
the conclusion of the existence of an imminent risk and the given EWMs used as bases for such conclu-
sion. See Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples from New
Zealand, WTO Doc. WT/DS367/AB/R, 29 November 2010, ¶ 236, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds367_e.htm (visited 8 January 2014).
It is worth highlighting that the use of econometric models for forward-looking purposes, as those
used in merger cases, has been subject to what some authors claim to be a stricter standard of review by
the courts of the European Union. See Lianos and Genakos, supra note 5, 58, citing Case C-12/03,
Commission v Tetra Laval. [2005] ECR I-987. The courts have required of the assessments carried out
by competition authorities not just descriptions of hypothetical anti-competitive behaviour, but specific
analyses of the likely evolution of each of the markets in question. It is the present author’s view that the
standard of review suggested here of a host State’s conclusion that there was a risk of a grave and immi-
nent risk to its economy does not differ much in terms of the depth of the assessment of the govern-
ment’s decision that the European Court of Justice made in Commission v Tetra Laval. In effect, the
standard of review recommended in this article is based on the evolution of specific economic variables
over a certain period of time as shown by the given EWMs and not just on the hypothetical evolution of
the variables.
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on the basis of data, coherence, and objectivity. Otherwise, the invocation of a non-
precluded measures clause should fail and full compensation be owed to investors.123
2. Early warning models and the determination of a substantial
contribution to the situation of necessity124
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is worth mentioning that the assessment of
this requirement or lack of substantial contribution by investor/State tribunals deal-
ing with the Argentine crisis has sometimes included a list of the main causes, both
internal and external, and from there the conclusion that Argentina’s contribution
was substantial or did not exist has just followed. For instance, the tribunal in
National Grid P.L.C. v Argentine Republic found that the Argentine crisis had been the
result of several causes: internal policies that were under the control of Argentina
and external shocks; the former ‘created a fertile ground for the crisis to develop
when in the late nineties the external factors…came to play’.125 On this basis, and al-
though the tribunal had previously stated that both external and internal elements
had contributed ‘in significant part’ to the crisis,126 the tribunal held that the contri-
bution had been substantial and that the excuse of necessity had to fail.127 A similar
123 A related point is whether this approach is enough to prevent the abuse of crisis prevention based on
EWMs and whether host States should also incur additional costs as a result of such potential abuse. It
could be suggested, on the basis of WTO law, that retaliation could be an alternative in the form of a
similar invocation of non-precluded measures clauses to avert an economic crisis by the State of the in-
vestor to justify measures against nationals of the first host State, which allegedly abused the clause. To
the present author, the cost of retaliation of this sort seems to be unlikely to occur, for many reasons.
First, it is difficult to imagine that the best alternative a State has to address the abuse of the other State
party to a BIT is that of itself declaring the existence of an upcoming crisis. Crisis prevention is always
costly in economic and political terms and a resort to it seems to be, for this reason, unlikely. Second,
there will always be other diplomatic tools, much less costly, to address this specific concern of abuse of
non-precluded measures clauses rooted in crisis prevention. Third, the retaliatory invocation of non-pre-
cluded measures clauses must itself meet the requirements of the clause, and the mere fact that a State
party to a BIT is abusing the clause does not generally allow the other State party to invoke it. Such re-
taliatory invocation is likely to be unlawful. Retaliation is a valid tool in WTO law, not in foreign invest-
ment law.
This is not to say that States abusing the use of EWMs to adopt measures aimed at preventing an eco-
nomic crisis and subsequently invoking the given BIT non-precluded measures clause to justify the viola-
tion of investors’ rights would only incur the cost of compensating investors after international
arbitration. The abuse of non-precluded measures clauses based on crisis prevention would, in most
probability, increase the risk of investing in the abusing State, and investors would charge a premium to
place their investment there. This is in itself an important additional cost that helps to deter the abuse
of such clauses.
124 The requirement of lack of substantial contribution is specifically provided for in Article 25(2)(b) of the
ILC’s Articles and should also exist regarding BIT non-precluded measures clauses. For the detailed jus-
tification of this conclusion, see Alvarez-Jimenez, The Interpretation of Necessity Clauses in BITs, supra
note 92, 441–42.
125 National Grid Award, supra note 90, ¶ 260.
126 Ibid.
127 See ibid. See also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. vs The
Argentine Republic, (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19), and AWG Group vs The Argentine Republic, Decision
on Liability, 30 July 2010, ¶ 264 [Suez Vivendi Decision on Liability], available at http://italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0826.pdf (visited 10 January 2014); Impregilo Award, supra note
92, ¶ 358; Suez Aguas de Barcelona Decision on Liability, supra note 109, ¶ 242.
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reasoning, but reaching the opposite conclusion, was carried out by the Continental
tribunal.128
For the purpose of the application of the substantial State contribution require-
ment, it is then important to determine when an action or omission by a State can
be regarded as a contribution to the given crisis. This section turns to evaluate how
EWMs can be used by States and international tribunals when dealing with the re-
quirement of lack of contribution to the situation of necessity.
The first way in which EWMs can be relevant for this purpose is to determine
whether a State can lawfully claim that it did not contribute to a situation of necessity
given the fact that its EWMs did not send any signal and missed the given crisis. As
was seen above, EWMs may sometimes not include variables that may end up being
determinant in bringing about a crisis, or the threshold of the variables was too high.
No risk or threat was foreseen, the argument would go; thus, no omission took place
at the time and in light of the available information, and therefore, no contribution
took place in the form of lack of prevention of the crisis.129
The scrutiny of this justification should be assessed in light of the principle of
good faith. Indeed, if the several EWMs with different methodologies and data do
not send warnings, it is certainly reasonable for a State to claim that it could not
have failed to prevent what it did not see coming. However, EWMs are not the only
tools States have to assess the state of their economies. Consequently, the absence of
warnings as a result of the use of EWMs should not always be conclusive.
Assessments resulting from the information provided by market participants, and by
the use of other analytical tools, should have been carried out. If these other tools
also missed the crisis, there would be additional grounds to conclude that the State
did not make a contribution by failing to prevent the crisis. But, if the other tools did
anticipate the given crisis, a State should demonstrate why it did not pay heed to
them and why it based its policy-making on the information furnished by its EWMs.
Only after providing a reasoned ground for such conclusion should an international
tribunal conclude that a State did not contribute to the situation of necessity by fail-
ing to prevent a crisis that its EWMs missed.
The second relevant situation is the assessment of the contribution to the state of
necessity in the event in which a State did not act upon an EWM that repeatedly
sent warning signals over several months.130 A warning may be sent, but this does
not mean that political actors will react to it. Such reactions depend on the incentives
and limitations that policy-makers may face at a particular moment.131 For instance,
a government may not have a majority in elected bodies to ensure the passing of
128 See Continental Award, supra note 94, ¶ 236.
129 The fact that a tribunal declared that a State did not fail to prevent a crisis and, therefore, such failure
cannot be regarded as a specific contribution to the situation of necessity, as important as it is, would
not always prevent a tribunal from concluding that in general, a State substantially contributed to the
given crisis. This would be so because a failure to prevent would be just one of the possible contribu-
tions, in the form of omissions, but there might have been others, particularly measures or actions, that
could have prompted the economic calamity in question and led the tribunal to the said general
conclusion.
130 Recall that EWMs are now designed to send warning signals with a lag of several months, in many cases
one year, so policy-makers can react and prevent the potential crisis.
131 See Bussière and Mulder, Early Warning Signals, supra note 36, 7.
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legislation, which may make the prevention of the crisis much more difficult to
achieve.132 On the other hand, political consensus to adopt preventive measures and
avoid a still non-visible crisis may be elusive, since some political actors may not re-
gard the risks as credible or sufficient to introduce new legislation, costly in political
terms.133 As Bank of Canada researchers state:
Taking no action is costly when a financial stress is nearing, but so is taking ac-
tion when a financial event is not impending.134
On these bases, did the given State contribute to the crisis by failing to prevent a cri-
sis whose emergence it noticed in advance? To be sure, the answer to this question
would be factually intensive and depend on many circumstances: how much in ad-
vance the EWMs anticipated the crisis, whether other crisis prevention instruments
did not detect it, what explains the lack of action or of sufficient action on the part of
the State, among others.
However, whenever different EWMs coincide in anticipating a crisis several
months in advance and the State is still unable to prevent it, international tribunals
should, in principle, recognize that its omissions substantially contributed to the
situation. The quoted words of the Suez Aguas de Barcelona tribunal would apply
neatly.135
3. Crisis prevention based on the use of early warning models and the
different interpretative approaches to some of the requirements
of Article 25 of the ILC’s articles
The customary rule of necessity establishes as one of the requirements for its suc-
cessful invocation the uniqueness of the measure or action to achieve the goal of ad-
dressing the risk to the essential interest. In other words, other alternatives to
complying with the international obligation in question were not available to protect
the interest.
The Continental tribunal held that a significant margin of appreciation should be
allowed to States facing critical situations, since ‘it is not the time for nice judgments,
particularly when examined by others with the disadvantage of hindsight’.136 The
present author shares this perspective, in light of the significant costs of varied char-
acter that economic crises bring to States, societies, and individuals. However, it is
also important to caution that this deference cannot be unfettered, because it would




134 Christensen and Li, supra note 19, 9.
135 See supra text accompanying note 109.
136 Continental Award, supra note 94, ¶ 181. It is important to recall that the Continental tribunal was assess-
ing the requirement of uniqueness not on the basis of the customary rule, but on the basis of a BIT ne-
cessity clause interpreted in light of WTO law, where this requirement exists. The quoted statement,
though, perfectly applied to the identical requisite under the customary rule.
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So, a mixture of deference and strictness seems to be sound when international
tribunals interpret some of the requirements of Article 25, in general, when a State
adopts measures to prevent an economic crisis that violates international obligations.
In this case, the requirement of graveness and imminence should be assessed with
the deference criterion, within the terms mentioned above, since it is important to
endow States with the powers to avoid the economic, social, and political losses asso-
ciated with these events. However, courts and tribunals should take a stricter stance
regarding the evaluation of the uniqueness of the measures, under Article 25(1)(a),
in the said circumstance.137 In effect, regarding this requirement, governments
should expect a strict evaluation by international tribunals as to why such prevention
was not carried out with a measure that did not violate an international law obliga-
tion. It would be expected that States, in their pursuit of avoiding a crisis and when
they were not still facing the economic, social, and political costs associated with
the fragmentation of societies and elites, had enough instruments to achieve this
goal without having, in principle, to take actions contrary to their international
obligations.
The mixture of deference and lack thereof to governments by international courts
in the interpretation of the various requirements of a single international law provi-
sion, whose texts do not call for them, seems to be an oddity. However, it is a valid
approach rooted in a sound policy: the legitimacy of international adjudication and
its ability to settle international disputes. Indeed, it is one thing for an international
tribunal to declare that a government failed in its customary defence because the im-
minence or gravity of the risk did not exist, a pronouncement that goes to the heart
of what governments are meant to do, to protect their economies and citizens. It is
quite another to declare that the defence failed because the State had other means to
achieve the prevention other than through the violation of an international obliga-
tion. Domestic opposition to the award may be higher towards the former than
towards the latter decision.
137 The uniqueness requirement has been an important obstacle for the successful invocation of the custom-
ary excuse of necessity in the case law stemming from the Argentine crisis. For instance, the Suez
Vivendi tribunal declared that Argentina had other means available but failed to identify them, which it
should have done (see Suez Vivendi Decision on Liability, supra note 127, ¶ 260). The Total tribunal
declared that Argentina had not demonstrated that it did not have other available means other than the
illegal measure to deal with the crisis (see Total Decision on Liability, supra note 92, ¶¶ 223–34). The
conclusion rested mostly on the allocation of burden of proof of the requirement, which fell on
Argentina, and on the fact that the investor had identified two alternative means that could have been
used, without Argentina having responded to prove why they were not available (see Total Decision on
Liability, supra note 92, ¶ 223; see also ibid, ¶ 345). The tribunal in Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona S.A., and InterAgua Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v the Argentine Republic also found the ex-
istence of alternative means to achieve the same result sought by the adopted measures in violation of
the BIT. However, the real availability of these means was not analyzed. See Suez Aguas de Barcelona
Decision on Liability], supra note 109, ¶ 238.
A model to follow in the evaluation of the uniqueness requirement is that carried out by the
Continental tribunal, regardless of its conclusion on this point. The tribunal assessed each of the sug-
gested alternatives in detail and in practical, not hypothetical, terms. For instance, alternatives that had
been tried and failed to prevent the crisis were not regarded as available for the purpose of the unique-
ness requirement, and neither were those whose costs were much higher than those of the adopted
measures (see Continental Award, supra note 94, ¶¶ 209–14).
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Given that the result is the same in both cases—the failure of the necessity
defence—there is then a policy reason to adopt a scheme of interpretation of the dif-
ferent requirements of the necessity exception that brings about the lesser institu-
tional costs for the international adjudicator, not to mention the more favourable
conditions for settlement that a decision based on such approach engenders.
A similar approach can exist regarding the interpretation and application of non-
precluded measures clauses, some of which might not include the uniqueness
requirement. Investor/State tribunals should adopt a deferential approach to the
evaluation of the technical bases of the imminence of the crisis and a strict approach
regarding other requirements, such as the nexus between the measure and the crisis
in question.138
Jose Saramago in La Lucidité cannot better define the approach suggested here:
la nécessité…d’un équilibre destine à maintenir l’univers sur ses rails et les
planètes sur leur trajectoire commande que chaque fois que l’on retire quelque
chose d’un coté l’on ajoute quelque chose de plus o mois équivalent de
l’autre…139
4. Other uses of early warning models in the interpretation of BIT
non-precluded measures clauses or the customary rule
In addition to serving as a tool to determine when a crisis is about to take place,
EWMs can play an additional and very important role. Referring to continuous
EWMs, European Central Bank researchers argue that these models ‘are particularly
useful to determine when a crisis started and ended….’140
The date of the end of a crisis is not clear-cut, as the Great Recession evidences,
and Churchill’s words may portray well this difficulty, even quoted out of context: ‘It
is not the end, it is not the beginning of the end, it is maybe the end of the begin-
ning.’ The difficulty regarding the definition of the ending of a crisis is also well illus-
trated by the fact that the same 2001 Argentine crisis ended at different times for
several tribunals.141
Perhaps, to avoid this problem, some international tribunals have adopted a differ-
ent approach when applying both a BIT non-precluded measures clause and the cus-
tomary rule: they have assessed whether the State was facing a grave and imminent
risk to the economy at the time it adopted the measure contrary to international law.
138 Moloo and Jacinto hint at this point, although not in the context of the analysis carried out here. See
Moloo and Jacinto, supra note 121, 567.
139 ‘[t]he oft-invoked need for balance which has kept the universe on track and the planets on course
means that whenever something is taken from one side, it is replaced by something else on the other…’
140 See Babecký et al., supra note 15, 7.
141 The duration of the Argentine crisis was much shorter for the LG&E tribunal than for the CMS tribunal.
For the former, it ran from 1 December 2001, until 26 April 2003, while for the latter, it ran from 17
August 2000, to some time at the end of 2004 or beginning of 2005. See LG&E Decision on Liability,
supra note 95, ¶¶ 226–29; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v Argentine Republic, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, 12 May 2005, ¶¶ 250, 441, available at: http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType¼CasesRH&actionVal¼showDoc&docId¼DC504_En&caseId¼C4 (visited
13 January 2014).
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For instance, the Total tribunal, deciding the necessity defence under the customary
rule, also refused to excuse a violation of the given BIT, because Argentina had car-
ried out the actions in question on 11 August 2004, when it was not facing a grave
and imminent peril.142 A slightly different approach was adopted by the Continental
tribunal. It declared that a swap of Treasury Bills (Argentine Government Treasury
Bills (LETE)) against new securities on 9 December 2004, which were rejected by
the claimant, since the offer meant that the investor would receive in exchange just
US$0.30 per dollar,143 was offered ‘when Argentina’s financial conditions were evolv-
ing towards normality’.144 The reason for this evolution was the fact that Argentina
had re-entered the international financial market in September 2004.145
Determining when a given crisis ends is a very important decision for the purpose
of international investment law and has quite important consequences for host
States and investors. First of all, the date of the end of the crisis sets a limit to host
States’ ability to adopt measures that affect investors. Measures subsequently enacted
will not get the benefits of the BIT clause or the customary rule. Additionally, and
from the investor’s perspective, the end of the given crisis means that compensation
is fully owed to it by the host State afterwards, even if the necessity excuse under
CIL is successful due to its temporary character.146,147
Economic fundamentals may not return to pre-crisis levels at the same time, and
a decision must be made regarding which indicators must be chosen to conclude
that an economic crisis has ended. While an answer to the issue of the end of a crisis
is factual and specific and should be made on a case-by-case basis, it is possible to
simply say that the closer the fundamentals of the given economy are to their histor-
ical trends, the less imminent and grave the risk is. In fact, once this return is shown,
the risk may have well become just probable, to use the ICJ’s words, and, therefore,
outside the scope of BIT non-precluded measures clauses or the customary rule.
However, this conclusion has to be seen in light of what Bussière has identified,
in the sense that there is a risk after a currency crisis of a new one. In his words,
‘Vigilance must not decrease after a first (currency) crisis has happened as it may be
followed by another crisis soon after.’148 Consequently, the conclusion that an econ-
omy was on the path of recovery at a certain time can be reached only once the risk
142 See Total Decision on Liability, supra note 92, ¶¶ 337, 345. The Total tribunal did not offer any ground
for this conclusion, in part because the measures and omissions were not proven by Argentina to be con-
nected to any essential interest. See ibid, ¶ 345.
143 See Continental Award, supra note 94, ¶ 220.
144 Ibid, ¶ 221.
145 See ibid, ¶ 159. Further evidence of the recovery was that Argentina had repaid all amounts outstanding
to the IMF in 2005 and January 2006. See ibid, ¶ 159.
146 In this regard, the ICJ stated in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros that ‘[a]s soon as the state of necessity ceases to
exist, the duty to comply with treaty obligations revives’. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros, supra note 92, ¶
101.
147 The end of the crisis has not had the same effect when BIT non-precluded measures clauses are applic-
able to the dispute. According to the Continental tribunal, for instance, the justification afforded by the
clause at issue meant that no compensation was ever due to investors. See Continental Award, supra
note 94, ¶¶ 266, 304. To be sure, the same cannot be said regarding violations of a BIT brought about
after the crisis ended, in which case compensation from the time of the adoption of the measure is due
to the investor. See Continental Award, supra note 94, ¶ 305.
148 Bussière, How Early Were the Warning Signals, supra note 17, 1603.
Early Warning Models and Int’l Investment Law  31







of a revival of the crisis at the time of adoption of the measure in question has been
evaluated and discarded. This is to say that looking only at the positive performance
of the given economy in the recent past should not necessarily be enough to arrive
at the said conclusion.
It is certainly up to international tribunals to make the determination as to when
a crisis ended or when there is no longer a risk over the given economy.149 They
enjoy significant latitude to choose the economic fundamentals or factual situations
on which to ground such conclusion. However, EWMs can be used to offer a more
reasoned decision since, in particular, out-of-sample EWMs continue to send warn-
ing signals that there is a risk of a crisis or that there is an ongoing crisis, until the
model no longer sends warnings, a moment that marks the end of the risk or of the
calamity. Thus, for instance, if a host State relied on EWMs to successfully prevent a
crisis, the very same EWMs could be used to determine when the grave and immi-
nent risk disappeared.150 The given host State would not be able to claim the benefit
of a BIT necessity clause or of the customary rule for measures contrary to interna-
tional obligations adopted after a date for which its own EWMs did not see any
risk.151
I I I . C O N C L U S I O N
The present article has illustrated the extraordinary costs of economic crises in terms
of increasing unemployment, decline of housing prices, equity prices and tax revenue,
fall of GDP, and raise of government debt over several years. It does not come as a
surprise that States and international financial institutions are developing economic
models, paramount among them EWMs, aimed at detecting these costly events.
The article has presented a description of the different kinds of EWMs, the chal-
lenges modellers face regarding the choice of the relevant variables, the availability
and reliability of data, and how EWMs should be used in practice by States as a pol-
icy-making tool. The article has also illustrated that EWMs have performed in the
past much better than other instruments also used to anticipate economic crises of
any sort, such as pure guess research and non-model-based forecasts, namely, agency
ratings and private analysts rating currency risks.
However, not all economists agree on the usefulness of EWMs, and the article has
shown the main criticisms that EWMs have received and the scepticism around their
value as a crisis prevention instrument. Despite such objections, and even with their
149 To be sure, a crisis should not just be regarded to have ended once all the economic fundamentals have
returned to their pre-crisis level, since at this time, not only is there not a probable risk of crisis over the
economy, but there is no risk at all.
150 However, this is not to say that EWMs may always furnish a clear and unequivocal date of the end of
the risk of a crisis or of the end of the crisis in a way that makes international arbitral tribunals’ judgment
unnecessary. As was seen, governments may rely on more than one EWM with different methodologies
and data, so they may have not stopped sending warnings at the same time, and a decision based on
judgment must be made as to what this date is. However, in such an event, the use of EWMs may be
the guiding element in making such determination.
151 There might be occasions, though, in which particular EWMs might not be useful for the purpose of
determining the end of a crisis. For instance, it is clear that an EWM that missed a crisis cannot be lately
used to determine when this ended.
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limitations, EWMs are a good substitute for judgment-based assessments and may
serve to narrow the possibility of crisis denial in order to evade political costs. In any
case, EWMs are here to stay, since important improvements to their design may be
expected as a result of the significant amount of resources devoted to them in the
aftermath of the Great Recession.
In addition to the economics of EWMs, this article has discussed the role that
they may play in the interpretation and application of BIT non-precluded measures
clauses and the customary rule of necessity. The starting point of the article in this
regard is that, drawing on WTO law, the lack of consensus among economists on
the usefulness of EWMs should neither prevent the said role nor dilute its
importance.
Delving into such a role, the article has illustrated three main dimensions. First,
there is the value that EWMs may have in proving the existence of a grave and immi-
nent risk to economies for the purpose of the invocation of the given non-precluded
measures clause or the customary rule. The article has suggested in this regard that,
despite the existence of diverse views on EWM design, international arbitration tribu-
nals should be deferent to the economic bases in EWMs of a State’s conclusion that
a crisis is upcoming and that measures are required to prevent it. The article has
shown that such deference is not totally strange to investor/State arbitration and
that it does prevent arbitration tribunals from carrying out a rigorous assessment on
whether the State’s conclusion as to the gravity and imminence of the given eco-
nomic calamity is objective and coherent and has a sufficient basis in the available
data of the EWMs.
The second dimension is related to the requirement of lack of contribution to the
situation of necessity under Article 25(2)(b), which requirement may also exist
under BITs non-precluded measures clauses. This article has shown under which
conditions EWMs can be used by States to demonstrate that they did not contribute
to the given crisis by failing to prevent it, when their EWMs missed the given crisis
and did not send warnings. Furthermore, international arbitration tribunals may face
the case of States that did not act upon the warnings sent by their EWMs and are
invoking a BIT non-precluded measures clause or the customary rule. The article
argues that whenever different EWMs coincide in anticipating a crisis and the given
State was still unable to prevent it, international tribunals should, in principle, declare
that its omissions substantially contributed to the crisis.
The third and final dimension of EWMs is the use arbitration tribunals may make
of them to determine the end of crisis. The article has shown that tribunals dealing
with the Argentine calamity have had diverse views on when it ended, and their deci-
sions in this regard have been based mainly on pure judgment. EWMs could provide
tribunals with more solid grounds to determine such a date as to future economic
calamities.
‘Les crises aggravent les incertitudes, favorisent les interrogations; elles peuvent
stimuler la recherche de solutions nouvelles…’ says the French philosopher
Edgar Morin, commenting on the Great Recession. The latter has prompted new de-
velopments in economics, and international investment law and adjudication should
draw on them to evolve. This article has sought to make a contribution in this
direction.
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